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Who Says So?
Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment by
Science, Sentiment, and Consensus
by AIMEE LOGAN*
"Who says so? Is there an established correlation between mental
acuity and the ability to conform one's conduct to the law in such a
rudimentary matter as murder? Are the mentally retarded really more
disposed (and hence more likely) to commit willfully cruel and serious
crime than others? In my experience, the opposite is true .... 1
- Justice Antonin Scalia
J.D. Candidate 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2001,
University of San Diego. The author has accepted a position as an associate at Cooley Godward
Kronish LLP in Palo Alto, California, and will begin working in the fall 2008. She would like to
express her sincere thanks to Professor David Faigman for his constant support and direction. His
expertise in science and the law proved indispensable to the success of the note.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Whether there is anything in Justice Scalia's "experience" that would render such reliance
reasonable, one can only wonder. Scalia's own "experience" may not be the only thing guiding
the Court in this decision. Scalia criticizes the majority for this decision, which "rest[s] so
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members." Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[195]
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I. Introduction2
Though he may not have realized it, Justice Scalia's statement may be
highly indicative of how the Supreme Court integrates science into its
decisions. How does the Court come to a decision on topics that
necessarily implicate science and the law? If not based on science, is
national consensus or the Justices own sentiments a sufficient basis? How
are the states, when implementing such laws, to be directed and guided
when no substance is given to the Court's pronouncements? When it
comes to the intersection of constitutional law and science, actual scientific
evidence must somehow be incorporated.
The legal system does not always know how to integrate science into
its decisions, laws or theories. Though the courts often employ medical
3
terminology in their decisions, there exists great disparity between the legal
meanings given these terms and their medical or scientific significance.
Mental retardation (also "MR"), in particular, poses a unique problem for
the legal community. In that instance, both the courts and the medical
community have used the same terminology, MR. Importantly, however,
though they use the same label, the two fields necessarily mean very
different things. This causes great confusion amongst legislatures and
courts. In order to give legal significance to mental retardation, the
Supreme Court must operationally define it.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court declared that imposing capital
punishment on individuals with mental retardation violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4 Usually
reticent to impose blanket prohibitions on the States, the Court nonetheless
2. Individuals with mental retardation have been labeled as "idiots," "imbeciles,"
"morons," and worse by society, science, and the legal system. In reviewing literature for this
Note, I followed a growing trend towards less pejorative terminology as suggested by Stephen
Greenspan in his article, What is Meant by Mental Retardation?, wherein he noted that the
"United States is now one of the few Western countries where the term MR is still in use." 11
INT'L REV. OF PSYCHIATRY 6, 7 (1999). He suggested greater use of:
'People First' language [as]... a form of terminology usage [that]... was developed
by a self-advocacy organization, the essence of which is to use the term 'mental
retardation' (or 'intellectual disability') as a noun describing a quality or trait which one
possess (e.g. 'child [or person] with [or who has] MR') rather than as an adjective (e.g.
'mentally retarded children' [or persons]), or noun (e.g. 'retardates,' 'the retarded,' 'he
is mentally retarded') which characterizes the total person.
Id. In order to be consistent with literature and judicial decisions regarding mental retardation, I
have kept that phrase, though have attempted to integrate People First language throughout the
Note.
3. Throughout this Note, the words "medical" and "scientific" include psychological and
psychiatric fields.
4. 536U.S.at321.
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found a class of offenders, individuals with mental retardation, exempt
from the penalty. However, similar to other contexts, such as insanity, the
Court left it to the states to adopt constitutionally appropriate measures to
ensure the Atkins mandate was followed and individuals with MR were
excluded from capital punishment.5
Important for this discussion, the Court did not pronounce any
meaningful operational definitions that would guide the states in coming to
those decisions. Instead, it allowed "national consensus" to determine, in
part, the definition and identification of MR.6 Whether current scientific
evidence must be a factor in "national consensus" was not addressed. If the
scientific and legal systems mean different things while utilizing the same
terminology, then not only is the Court's constitutional mandate potentially
being ignored, but individuals are being deprived of their constitutional
rights: namely, a punishment that is proportionate to the severity of the
offense and one that is not cruel and unusual.
This note will begin by identifying scientific or medical models of
MR, including the methods employed in diagnosing mental retardation.
Next, this note will look to the Court's decision in Atkins to examine
whether its rationale for exempting individuals with MR comports with the
medical understanding of that illness. Third, this note will look to the
States' implementation of Atkins to reveal how the Court's lack of
operational definition has led to inconsistent state practices, irrelevant legal
definitions of mental retardation and inadequate procedures for identifying
and exempting individuals with mental retardation from the death penalty.
Finally, this note adopts the view that constitutionally relevant definitions
and mechanisms for identification of MR must be created.
II. Defining Mental Retardation
"Mental retardation is a deficit in intellectual or cognitive
functioning. 7 Though often confused by lay persons, mental illness and
MR are not synonymous. Mental retardation is not a subset or type of
mental illness. Instead, "[m]ental illness is caused by bio-psycho-social
5. Id. at 317 ("[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences," (quoting Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986))).
6. Id. ("Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall
within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus.").
7. Douglas K. Detterman, The Psychology of Mental Retardation, 11 INT'L REV. OF
PSYCHIATRY 26, 26 (1999).
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factors that affect one's behavior and psychological disposition."8  In
contrast, MR is caused by various biological, social, behavioral, medical,
educational and hereditary factors.9 Actual definitions of MR differ widely
among professionals and often are "heavily politicized."',0 Definitions do
seem to agree on three criteria: an individual's IQ score, their level of
impaired adaptive behavior and the age of onset of their symptoms.
A. IQ as a Measure of Intelligence
IQ tests are the most frequently employed tests to measure
intelligence, detect cognitive deficits and diagnose mental retardation.
While helpful, there is an "over-reliance" on an individual's IQ score "as a
basis for both social policy and individual intervention [that] has been
criticized by many scholars . . .,,"
Further and more importantly, "there is widespread dissatisfaction
with the reliance on IQ score as the sole measure of intelligence."' 12 The
reliability of IQ scores is susceptible to numerous factors., 3 IQ tests have
been criticized by scientists who argue that they do not know what
intelligence tests actually measure. 14 Intelligence itself is difficult to define
and is in some sense "arbitrary."' 5 There are many facets and possible
components of intelligence: vocabulary, problem solving ability, social
intelligence, mental acuity, ability to learn from past mistakes, and many
more. Further, the reliability of an individual's IQ score is susceptible to
numerous factors. 16 When the possibility of receiving the death penalty can
hinge on the difference of only one IQ point, these variables must be
factored in to state and court decisions that make a determination of mental
retardation based primarily on an individual's IQ score.
8. John M. Fabian, Life, Death, and IQ, in 5(4) J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 5
(2005).
9. Id.
10. Jamel Chelly et. al, Genetics and Pathophysiology of Mental Retardation, 14 EUR. J. OF
HUM. GENETICS 701, 701 (2006) (highlighting the American Psychiatric Association ("APA"),
which defines mental retardation as a "disability characterized by significant limitations in
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social and practical
adaptive skills, that onset before the age of 18 years." (citation omitted)).
11. Greenspan, supra note 2, at 7.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Stephen J. Ceci, Matthew Scullin & Tomoe Kanaya, The Difficulty of Basing Death
Penalty Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for Mental Retardation, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 11, 12-14
(2003).
14. N.J. MACKINTOSH, IQ AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 5 (Oxford University Press 1998).
15. Id. at 4.
16. Ceci et al., supra note 13, at 12-14.
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"[T]here is widespread dissatisfaction with the reliance on IQ score as
the sole measure of intelligence."' 7  Nonetheless, many believe that
whether or not IQ tests measure actual intelligence, they do test for
"something worth measuring."' 8 But even among those who do ascribe to
wide-spread use of IQ tests for quantifying intelligence, they do not believe
that "all who fall just below an arbitrary, and historically fluctuating" score
of seventy have mental retardation and likewise, that all those whose scores
are above seventy are free from mental retardation. 
1 9
The first IQ test was developed at the beginning of the twentieth
century.2° While initially used to identify children who had a greater risk
of failing in the school systems, the test was later identified as an
assessment tool for mental retardation. 21 Today, David Wechler's IQ tests
are the most frequently used by professionals.22 The most recent test, the
Wechler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV ("WAIS-IV") includes eleven
subtests. Six subtests measure verbal ability (Information, Vocabulary,
Comprehension, Arithmetic, Similarities, Digit Span) and five tests for
performance (Picture Completion, Picture Arrangement, Block Design,
Object Assembly, Digit Symbol).23 All of Wechsler's subtests correlate
with one another.24 That means a score on one subtest is predictive and
correlative of scores on the other subtests. While this may suggest that the
subtests are all measuring the same thing, it also may mean that they are
measuring only one component of intelligence, which tells little of an
individual's overall capabilities.
Of particular importance, Wechsler's tests do not purport to test
problem solving or reasoning abilities, 25 skills important to the Supreme
Court in its reasoning for exempting the group from death eligibility.26
17. Greenspan, supra note 2, at 6.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Greenspan, supra note 2, at 6-7.
20. Detterman, supra note 7, at 26.
21. Id.
22. MACKINTOSH, supra note 14, at 28.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id.
25. Id. at31-32;
26 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 stating that "[b]ecause of their impairments, [they] have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others." citing J. McGee & F. Menolascino, The Evaluation of
Defendants with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds.
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Wechsler was well aware of the absence and he deliberately left out such
tests because of his belief that these were poor measures of intelligence. z7
Wechsler's tests then are an incomplete measurement tool in identifying
those factors the Supreme Court found compelling about individuals with
mental retardation that warranted their exception from the death penalty.
B. Measuring Deficits in Adaptive Behavior to Identify Mental
Retardation
Identifying deficits in adaptive behavior is critical to accurately
diagnosing MR. A significant obstacle in testing for adaptive behavior is
that "this term was invented by the AAMR for use in its dual criteria
definition of MR, and there is no body of prior experience regarding what
the term meant or how it might be measured. 28 Today, most behavioral
scales are drawn largely from the AAMR's "Adaptive Behaviour Scale"
("ABS").29 These are largely rating instruments rather than psychometric
tests (such as IQ tests). 30 As the AAMR asserts, "Standardized measures of
intelligence do not completely describe one's intellectual capacity, and
similarly, standardized measures of adaptive behaviors do not completely
reflect a person's ability to adapt to everyday life demands and function in
society."3'
There is no uniform way to measure adaptive behavior. Some
psychologists make a "subjective clinical judgment" of an individual's
adaptive behavior, others use objective instruments, and of course, some
employ a mixture of both subjective and objective tools. 32  Potentially
problematic is that although these tests often include institutionalized
individuals in their normative samples, none include death row inmates,
whose particularly unique form of institutionalization, incarceration, may
greatly alter the reliability of these objective instruments.33
C. Identifying Age of Onset
Both the AAMR and the American Psychiatric Association ("APA")
definitions of mental retardation require an onset prior to the age of
1992); Appelbaum & Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice Related Competencies in Defendants with
Mental Retardation, 14 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 487-489 (Winter 1994).
27. MACKINTOSH supra note 14, at 32.
28. Greenspan, supra note 2, at 14 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Fabian, supra note 8, at 9 citing AAMR, 2002.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 14.
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eighteen. The American Psychological Association on the other hand,
permits symptoms to present up to the age of twenty-two. The ability to
determine the age of onset is problematic if a suspect or defendant has no
medical records that make or support a diagnosis of MR. While school
records and first-hand accounts can provide evidence that an individual
faced developmental challenges prior to adulthood, unless an individual
received both IQ tests and adaptive behavioral tests, satisfying this third
prong may be difficult. This is troubling considering that many defendants
did not receive adequate medical attention and may not have consistent
school records that could corroborate their mental deficiencies.
III. Why Mental Retardation Matters
Since the Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, appropriately
identifying whether a particular defendant has mental retardation can make
the difference of whether a defendant receives life or death for first degree
murder. This section offers a brief overview of death penalty jurisprudence
leading up to the Atkins decision. It ends with a thorough discussion of
Atkins and its rationale.
A. The Long Road to Atkins
A strict constructionist or textualist finds little constitutional difficulty
with the death penalty. "It is apparent from the text of the Constitution
itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the
Framers. 34 The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital ... crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury,. . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.",35  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted over
seventy-five years after the Fifth, also "contemplates the existence of the
capital sanction in providing that no State shall deprive any person of 'life,
liberty, or property' without due process of law.",36 Even in his famous
dissent explaining why he would no longer "tinker with the machinery of
death,, 37 Justice Blackmun referred to "intellectual, moral and personal
reasons" for refusing to impose the death penalty, but he never argued that
capital punishment was contrary to the constitution.38
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
36. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
37. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurring). While Justice Blackmun always personally
disagreed with the desirability of the death penalty, something throughout his tenure on the Court
did cause him to change his constitutional philosophy regarding the death penalty in the years
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between Furman v. Georgia and Callins. It was not so much that Justice Blackmun believed the
death penalty was "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment," as did
his colleagues, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. LINDA GREENHOUSE,
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 175-76
(Henry Holt & Company, LLC 2005). Instead, Blackmun believed that "the death penalty [could
not] be imposed fairly within the constraints of the Constitution" under any circumstances. Id. at
179 (quotations omitted). To note the change in Blackmun's outlook see where in Furman,
Blackmun observed:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no one
in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty,
with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by
finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no
useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training and
life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been
able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life." Were I a
legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by
counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the several opinions
filed by the Justices who vote to reverse these judgments....
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-06 (1972). Blackmun then noted that until this decision,
"capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not unconstitutional per se under the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment," quoting Chief Justice Warren's view in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958):
At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional
limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both
on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they
are forceful the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty....
Id. at 408 n.5 (quotations omitted). Blackmun concluded by stating, "Although personally I may
rejoice at the Court's result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law,
or of constitutional pronouncement." Id. at 414. However, in Callins, twenty-two years after
Furman, Justice Blackmun remarked:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more
than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to
coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the
need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to
concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save
the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic question-
does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants "deserve" to
die?-cannot be answered in the affirmative. It is not simply that this Court has
allowed vague aggravating circumstances to be employed, relevant mitigating evidence
to be disregarded, and vital judicial review to be blocked. The problem is that the
inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.
510 U.S. at 1145-46 (internal citations omitted). Justice Blackmun retired in 1994; so far as the
public is aware, no sitting Supreme Court Justice views the death penalty as unconstitutional. See
Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: the Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1995).
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Nonetheless, "death is different., 39 It is the criminal justice system's
most severe penalty that is reserved for only the most heinous of crimes
and most culpable of offenders. The "words of the [Eighth] Amendment
are not precise, and ... their scope is not static., 40  Rather, the
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment "draw[s]
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society. 41
The Court's "evolving standards of decency '42 test is two-pronged.
First, the Court analyzes "objective factors to the maximum possible
extent. 43  Such indicia have been legislative acts and voting trends of
juries. Second, this test permits and even mandates that the Justices
themselves weigh in to assess whether or not the death penalty "comports
with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the [Eighth]
Amendment.",44 The Court determines this, in part, by considering whether
the death penalty is "so totally without penological justification that it
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering. 4 5 Perhaps absent from the
Court's reasoning in modem death penalty jurisprudence is the necessary
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (discussing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 373 (1909)).
41. Id. at 101; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (noting that "[a]t a
minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered cruel and unusual at the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted," (citing Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 405. However, the "prohibitions
of the Eighth Amendment are not limited ... to those practices condemned by the common law in
1789." Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (citing Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 406). Rather, "[t]he prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the 'evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at
101)).
42. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
43. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)); see also Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980).
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100). For a discussion about the role of
the Court and implications of possible democratic failure if the Justices' subjective opinions are
brought to bear, see Susan M. Raeker-Jordan, Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at
the Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L. REV. 100
(2006). For the view that such subjective reasoning is not only inevitable, but desirable, see
Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1723 n.16 (1998) (arguing
that decision-making should come from the "inside out," permitting the Justices to come to
conclusions that fit within their legal, political and moral beliefs). For a discussion about these
and many other judicial philosophies, see David Niven & Kenneth W. Miller, Federalism by
Convenience: The Supreme Court's Judicial Federalists on the Death Penalty and States' Rights
Controversies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005), see also Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate
Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54
ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1139 (2003) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180-81).
45. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
scientific support that must instruct the Court's constitutional fact-finding
when dealing with mental retardation.
The nation's most extreme penalty must not be applied in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.4 6 Through applying this test in various cases, the
Court has determined that the death penalty violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments when its application is an "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,, 47 if it is disproportionate to the crime
committed,4 8 or if the sentencer's discretion is not adequately and
specifically guided so that the individual "nature or circumstances of the
crime committed ... [and] the character or record of the defendant," are
properly considered. 49  Additionally, in capital cases, "the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender,"50 which would presume to include an evaluation of
the individual's mental deficiencies or abnormalities.
Indeed, in 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court held that the
presence of mental retardation constituted mitigating evidence that the
sentencer must be consider in capital cases." At that time, the Court
refused to go further and require a categorical exemption for the individuals
with MR.52 In ruling out a categorical exemption, the Court noted that the
individual symptoms and etiology of mental retardation differ from one
person to the next and thus it was up to the jury to determine if an
individual's unique deficits warranted a mitigation of punishment.53 The
Court reasoned that although it may violate the Eighth Amendment to
execute "profoundly or severely [mentally] retarded" persons, the insanity
defense was a sufficient protection for these individuals.54 Utilizing the
evolving standards of decency analysis, the Court found evidence of one
state's ban on execution of mentally retarded individuals as insufficiently
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(reinstating the death penalty and noting that "[t]he constitutionality of the sentence of death itself
was not at issue" in Furman. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170). Further, so long as state legislatures
enacted procedures that fit within the Constitution's framework, the Court would "presume its
validity" and not require the states to "select the least severe penalty possible so long as the
penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved." Gregg, 428
U.S. at 175.
48. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1909).
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
50. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
51. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
52 Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 333.
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compelling evidence of a "national consensus against the execution" of
these individuals.
55
Dissenting in Penry, Justice Brennan argued that those with mental
retardation should be categorically exempt from the death penalty.56 In
reasoning that would be echoed later in Atkins, Brennan believed "[t]he
impairment of a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abilities, control
over impulsive behavior, and moral development.., limits his or her
culpability. 57  Additionally, execution of those with mental retardation
was unconstitutional because it did not further the dual purposes of the
death penalty: retribution and deterrence. 8
B. Atkins v. Virginia
Nearly fifteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
changed course and categorically exempted those with mental retardation
from the imposition of the death penalty.59 Citing the group's inability to
be deterred by the penalty and the lack of retributive value to the death
penalty in this population, the Court held that the death penalty as applied
to this population was in violation of the Eighth Amendment and thus
unconstitutional.6° Perhaps most important to the Court's analysis was the
number of states that had adopted legislation outlawing capital punishment
for mentally retarded offenders and the "consistency of the direction of
change" among the states that had ruled on the issue.6'
In Atkins, Daryl Renard Atkins was sentenced to death after he was
convicted of "abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder., 62  Atkins,
along with his friend William Jones, kidnapped Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint. 3
After robbing him, the two drove Nesbitt to a nearby automated teller
55. Id. at 340.
56. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 346. Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice O'Connor's majority opinion and
believed that "by virtue of their mental retardation alone .... [the mentally retarded] inevitably
lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated
with the death penalty." Id. at 343-44 (quotations omitted).
58. Id. at 348.
59. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
60. Id.at 319-20.
61. Id. at 314-16 (noting that "[g]iven the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far
more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large
number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal." Id. at 315-316.).
62. Id. at 307.
63. Id.
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machine where he withdrew additional money for Atkins and Jones.64
Next, Atkins and Jones drove Nesbitt to an "isolated location where he was
shot eight times and killed., 65 At the penalty phase of the trial, Atkins's
defense called a forensic psychologist who testified that Atkins had an IQ
of fifty-nine, which signified mild to moderate mental retardation.66 In
spite of this, and conflicting evidence regarding who actually shot Nesbitt,
the jury sentenced Atkins to death.67
The Court applied the "evolving standards of decency" test.68 Turning
first to the "objective factors," the Court looked to legislation as the
"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values. 69
The Court noted that since its decision in Penry, fifteen states had enacted
legislation exempting those with MR from the death penalty.70 Two states
seemed poised to follow as similar legislation had passed in one house of
Congress in each. 71 Two other states already outlawed such executions at
the time of Penry and thus, together with the fourteen states that completely
repealed all capital punishment, the Court found persuasive evidence that
the practice had become "unusual. 72  Noting also the widespread
consensus among the international community, religious groups, and social
and professional organizations that such executions were immoral, the
Court was satisfied that "society view[ed] mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal. 73
The Court highlighted two other important reasons for the categorical
exemption. First, it was unclear whether either justification for the death
penalty, retribution or deterrence, even applied to individuals with MR.74
Retribution, or the idea of "just deserts," is contingent upon an individual's
culpability. 75 The Court noted that even the "average murderer" was not
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 308-09.
67. Id. at 309.
68. Id. at311-12.
69. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
70. Id. at 314-15. Those were: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington. Id. Of importance to the Court was the "consistency of the
direction of change" amongst those states that had looked at whether there should be such a
categorical exemption. Id.
71. Id. at 315.
72. Id. at 313-316.
73. Id. at 316, 316-17 n.21.
74. Id. at 318-20.
75. Id. at319.
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justified in receiving the harsh penalty of death and so "surely" the
"mentally retarded offender ... does not merit that form of retribution., 76
Furthermore, because of their cognitive and behavioral impairments, their
"diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses," they
were unlikely to be deterred since their acts of murder were not likely the
result of "premeditation and deliberation.,
77
Second, the Court worried that individuals with MR were more likely
to receive the death penalty despite mitigating factors, which would "call
for a less severe penalty. 7 8 Such individuals may be unable to render the
requisite assistance to their counsel in order to ensure a fair trial, are more
likely to make false confessions, make "poor witnesses," and their
courtroom "demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of
remorse for their crimes.",79 Finally, the Court engaged in the second part
of the "evolving standards of decency" test and expressed its own judgment
on the "acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."8
The Court's "independent evaluation ... reveal[ed] no reason to disagree"
with the legislatures' judgments. 81
C. Reconciling Atkins with Medical Models of Mental Retardation
Whereas the medical fields are concerned with identifying deficits in
intelligence, the Court is concerned with individuals whose impairments
have caused "diminished capacities to understand and process information,
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reaction of others. 82 Thus it makes sense for the medical community to
employ IQ tests and behavior-rating scales as their goal is to identify
deficits in intelligence, justifying looking to skills such as vocabulary and
76. Id.
77. Id. at319-20.
78. Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). In Lockett, the Supreme
Court held that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death." 438 U.S. at 604. Such individualized consideration is constitutionally
required because "the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all
other penalties .... Id. at 605.
79. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
80. Id. at 312, 321 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
81. Id. at 321.
82. Id. at 318.
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arithmetic.83 How these tests can indicate those factors dispositive to the
Court was not discussed and is altogether unclear.
IV. What the States Are Doing Post-Atkins
In Atkins, the Court left to the States "the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" of execution of
individuals with mental retardation. 84 The Court acknowledged the present
disagreement over "which offenders are in fact retarded," yet provided no
minimums or framework to guide the States.85
In its decision, the Court cited to two well-accepted definitions of MR
from the scientific community: first, from the APA and, second, from the
86AAMR. Yet, there are many definitions of mental retardation that differ
from one another greatly. 87  Did the Court endorse only the APA and
AAMR, or are states able to adopt definitions, tests and procedures they
83. See discussion supra Part I.A.
84. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 416-17).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 308 n.3. The APA defines MR as:
[S]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the
following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills,
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion
C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final
common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the
central nervous system.
Id. (quoting DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed.
2000)).
The American Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR") similarly defines MR as:
[S]ubstantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in
two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional
academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
Id. (quoting MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS
5 (9th ed. 1992)); see also LaJuana Davis, Intelligence Testing and Atkins: Considerations for
Appellate Courts and Appellate Lawyers, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 297, 300 (2003) (noting
that since Atkins, the AAMR definition has changed slightly and now reads, "Mental Retardation
is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in
adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability
originates before age 18.").
87. For a discussion of current definitions of MR, see Greenspan, supra note 2, at 10-14.
Greenspan defines definitions from the AAMR, APA, and American Psychological Association
(which is similar to definitions from the APA and AAMR, but that sets the age of onset at twenty-
two years old). Id. at 12. Greenspan also defines, "Mental age definitions," "Learning-based
definitions," the "IQ-Only approach," and "Social competence-based definitions." Id. at 12-14.
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deem appropriate, even if these are wildly out of line with current, majority
scientific views?
This section will examine the incongruence between scientific
definitions and models of mental retardation, and the legal requirements for
a finding of mental retardation. Importantly, the states have employed
terminology largely similar to the definitions adopted by the APA and
AAMR. However, the states deviate even from these definitions in
important regards.
In the time between Penry and Atkins, sixteen states exempted
individuals with MR from the death penalty. 8 Though the Court noted
these statutes in its decision in Atkins, it did not elaborate as to the
constitutionality of the particular statutes.8 9 Whether or not this signals the
Court's approval of the various standards set out in each is unclear. States
may interpret the Court's silence as evidence that their procedures were
deemed constitutional.9"
Even before the Court's decision in Atkins, those states that had
already statutorily outlawed capital punishment for individuals with mental
retardation had begun deciding how individuals with MR would be
identified. 91 In the time following Atkins, numerous other states have had
to decide questions such as what measures would be used to test for mental
retardation, threshold scores, burden of proof, whether the judge or jury
would make the determination, standard of review and more. 92 Atkins also
88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (2007), ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2007), COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101 (2007), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (West 2007), FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2007), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 through 35-36-9-6 (West
2007), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(d) (West 2006) (effective April 22, 1994), Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 532.130-140 (West 2007), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West 2007), NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-105.01 (LexisNexis 2007), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (West 2007), N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 2007), 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 346, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-27A-26.1 (2007), TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(1), (b) (2007), WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (2007); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 nn.9, 11-15 (citing statutes).
89. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
90. See Bowling v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 368-69 (Ky. 2005).
91. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 532.130-140 (West 2007) (setting IQ ceiling for MR at
70 points); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412 (1989) (repealed 2002) (similarly setting IQ ceiling at
70 but allowing for age of onset of symptoms before the age of 22).
92. In the time since Atkins, seven other states have enacted statutes regarding the
exemption from the death penalty for defendants with MR. These statutes are: CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1376 (West 2007), DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2007), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
2515A (2007), LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2007), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
174.098 (LexisNexis 2007) (effective October 1, 2003), UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15(a)-101 (2007)
(effective March 15, 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2007). Twelve states have
abolished the death penalty altogether (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin). Of the
remaining thirty-eight states, twenty-six have current death penalty statutes specifically
left undecided "whether its holding was retroactive; ... whether the issue
[could] be procedurally defaulted . . . ; ... the time frame, if any, at which
a finding of mental retardation is relevant ... ; [and] ... what showing, if
any, is required to trigger entitlement to a trial or evidentiary hearing on the
issue."93 While few states have had occasion to expound on all of these
issues, 94 many of these issues have been widely commented on; these
issues are discussed below.
A. Determining Whether a Defendant's Mental Problems Amount to
Statutorily Defined Mental Retardation
Definitions of mental retardation between the states are largely
congruent.95 Courts and legislatures have almost exclusively borrowed
from the definitions promulgated by the APA and the AAMR. While not
all states have yet adopted a definition, three requirements are common
amongst those who have: sub-average intellectual functioning, impaired
adaptive behavior, and age of onset.
1. Sub-Average Intellectual Functioning
First, there must be evidence of "significantly subaverage intellectual
,,96 o h tfunctioning. Most of the states have used IQ scores as an indication of
general intellectual function. Further, many states set bright line IQ scores
and thus ignore their constitutional mandate to consider each defendant
individually.97
exempting individuals with MR. Twelve states (Alabama, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas and
Wyoming) have yet to enact specific legislation. Nonetheless, courts in these states are
exempting individuals with MR from the death penalty in the interim. See, e.g., Ohio v. Lott, 779
N.E.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ohio 2002) (wherein the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the three-part
definition promulgated by the AAMR, stating that the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove MR by a preponderance of the evidence.)
93. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 369.
94. But see id.
95. But see Jennifer J. van Dulmen-Krantz, The Changing Face of the Death Penalty in
America: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Atkins v. Virginia and Policy Considerations for
States Reacting to the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Interpretation, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 185, 188 (2002) (arguing that the "lack of consistency in the state statutes is eerily
reminiscent of 1972, when the Supreme Court halted executions because it found that 'state death
penalty statutes were totally lacking standards."' (quoting American Civil Liberties Union
Freedom Network, ACLU Execution Watch, at http://www.aclu.org/executionwatch.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002))). The author argues that the varying statutes and their different definitions,
applications and assessments of mental retardation will give rise to Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violations. Id. at 199-200.
96. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (quoting the AAMR (citation omitted)).
97. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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Twenty-six of the thirty-eight states that permit the imposition of the
death penalty have statutorily exempted individuals with MR from the
penalty. Of the twenty-six, ten have set an IQ of seventy as a ceiling for
establishing mental retardation.98  Four others have taken an
indistinguishable route and set the bar at two or more standard deviations
below the mean IQ. 99 Recognizing a measurement of error, four states
allow for a person with an IQ of seventy-five to be included under the
exemption.100 Two states mandate an IQ of sixty-five or below to serve as
presumptive evidence the individual is mentally retarded, a score below
both the AAMR and APA designation of mental retardation. 10 The
remaining nine states with applicable statutes have set no numerical
quantification.0 2 Additionally, four courts in those states without statutes
have also set an IQ of seventy as the qualifying score above which a person
may not be exempt from the death penalty.
10 3
What distinguishes the states that have announced a required IQ, and
what presents a possible constitutional problem, is whether these scores are
presumptive evidence of mental retardation, or whether these scores
present bright-line rules from which no derivation is permitted. Believing
it had discretion whether or not to conform to the DSM-IV's "measurement
of error," and discounting the Flynn Effect and other statistical problems as
examples of permitted differences that "'generally conform[ed]' to the
approved clinical definitions," the Kentucky Supreme Court signaled that
an IQ score of seventy was a bright-line cut-off beyond which a defendant
98. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 373-74, 374 n.10 (citing Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington).
99. Id. at 374, 374 n. 11 (citing Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, and Virginia.). The mean IQ is
100 and each standard deviation is equal to fifteen points. Id. Thus, two standard deviations
below the mean is an IQ of seventy. Id.
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-15 (2007);
Lynch v. Mississippi, 951 So. 2d 549 (Miss. 2007); New Jersey v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 184
n.3 (N.J. 2006).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (2007).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101 (2007);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (West 2007); LA. CODE
CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.6 (West 2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098(7) (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(e)
(McKinney 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 (2007), see also Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 375
n.17.
103. Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002); Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014 (holding
that an IQ above 70 is a "rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded");
Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d 556, 558 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d
1, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 374 (listing three of the states).
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would be unable to avail him or herself of the mental retardation
exemption.1
0 4
Whether or not this is constitutionally problematic may turn on
whether the Court looks to science, sentiment or consensus should the
Court reexamine this issue. In Atkins, the Court noted that "[n]ot all people
who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the
range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national
consensus."' 1 5  What if scientists agree that individuals with an IQ of
seventy-five do in fact fall within the range of mild mental retardation?
Would states be allowed to ignore scientific findings and implement
policies they have a consensus about, even though the consensus may be
scientifically incorrect?
Further, though cited in its opinion as evidence of the legislative
change toward exempting offenders with MR, Kansas's statute in particular
may fall outside constitutional limits. That statute requires that an
individual's intellectual impairment rise to such a level that the offender
was unable to "appreciate the criminality of [their] conduct or to conform
[their] conduct to the requirements of law." 10 6 This language seems to be
in direct contradiction to the Court's reasoning in Atkins that individuals
with mental retardation "frequently know the difference between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial."' 17 In fact, offenders with MR are
not "exempt[ed] from criminal sanctions" because of their impairments;
rather, their culpability is lessened thereby exempting the group from
criminal law's most severe penalty.
0 8
2. Impaired Adaptive Behavior
Second, there must be evidence of impaired adaptive behavior. Many
statutory definitions enumerate specific skill areas where deficits must be
104. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 374-76 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22); see also Howell
v. Tennessee, 151 S.W.3d 450, 457-59 (Tenn. 2004) (also rejecting arguments that there must be
room for a measurement of error when interpreting an individual's IQ score and instead
permitting an IQ of seventy to constitute a bright line). In Bowling, the court discounted the
DSM-IV's recognition of an IQ of "approximately" seventy as an individual with MR as the
Court in Atkins only cited that information "uncritically" and instead focused on the lack of
consensus within the scientific community. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 368-69. Further, the court in
Bowling noted that in Atkins, the Court "uncritically" cited to Kentucky's statute thereby adding
to the justification for the state's law. Id.
105. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
106. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2006).
107. 536 U.S. at 318.
108. Id.
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present. 0 9 Although there is an explicit requirement for deficits in this
area, it is unclear how states measure adaptive behavioral deficits." °
According to the medical community, IQ tests alone are an insufficient
measure of maladaptive social behavior."'
States must measure impaired adaptive behavior, especially
considering that many death row inmates have borderline IQ scores of
mental retardation and, thus, these instruments are required in order to
complete an accurate assessment of an individual's impairments." 2 "The
social ineptness of anyone with other than very severe mental retardation is
likely to manifest itself more in novel and ambiguous situations, such as a
police interrogation or sexual coercion [rather] than in routine or clear-cut
situations."' 13 The states must employ tests able to identify and understand
how an individual with mental retardation utilizes their "cognitive and
affective schemas" to process, cope with and address "important, and in
some cases, very threatening, environmental challenges."
' 14
3. Manifestation of Symptoms Prior to Adulthood
It is not surprising that the states have widely incorporated the age of
onset requirements from the AAMR, APA and American Psychological
Association. Twenty states expressly require onset by the age of
109. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A (2007) (requiring "significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two (2) of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health and safety"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-115 (West 2007)
(requiring "significant deficits in adaptive behavior in at least 2 of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, social or interpersonal skills, home living, self-direction, academics,
health and safety, use of community resources, and work"); see also MO. ANN. STAT. §
565.030(6) (West 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney 2007); Lot, 779
N.E.2d 1011 (adopting the AAMR definition of MR); Blonner v. Oklahoma, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139
(Okla. Crim. App. 2006). But cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (West 2007) (citing KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 76-12b01 (2007), which defines "adaptive behavior" as the "effectiveness or degree...
of personal independence and social responsibility expected of that person's age, cultural group
and community.").
110. Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 317 (2002) (No. 00-8727). See, e.g., Lott, 779 N.E.2d at
1014.
111. See Fabian, supra note 8, at 9-10.
112. Id. at 16 (noting that because "most capital defendants fell in the high range of mild
mental retardation and/or borderline range of intelligence" they may have "slipped through the
cracks" and will not have childhood assessments of their deficits, which makes a thorough
examination of their present deficits all the more necessary.").
113. Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014.
114. Id.
eighteen," 5 while another six mandate onset during the "developmental
period."' 16  Only three states followed the American Psychological
Association and permit onset to occur before the age of twenty-two. 
1 7
B. Who Makes the Determination: Judge or Jury?
A judge is likely the finder of fact on the question of mental
retardation. In 2005, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision
overturning the Ninth Circuit's determination that the issue of mental
retardation had to be determined by a jury." 8 The Court specifically noted
that in Atkins, it left it to the states to "adopt[] their own measures for
adjudicating claims of mental retardation."'"19 The Court importantly noted
that while not all measures may pass constitutional muster, circuit courts
were not to preempt the states' ability to enact these procedural
requirements.12  In this case, Arizona had not weighed in one way or the
other and the Court did not analyze the constitutionality of the requirement
of a jury trial against any specific argument or reasoning.
In many jurisdictions, appellants have argued that denial of a jury trial
on the issue of mental retardation constitutes a violation of their Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.' 2 ' In light of the Court's decision in Ring
v. Arizona,122 (issued four days following Atkins) many defendants have
argued that a finding of absence of mental retardation increases a
defendant's maximum penalty and, thus, the defendant is entitled to a jury
determination of mental retardation.
23
Additionally, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,124 the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required juries to find,
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, any factual determination that would
115. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia and Washington.
116. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Nevada and South Carolina.
117. Indiana, Maryland and New Jersey.
118. Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 7-8 (2005).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 377; New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1266 (N.M. 2004).
122. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the jury, not the judge, must find
beyond a reasonable doubt, any aggravating factor that was necessary for the imposition of the
death penalty).
123. See Arizona v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 705-708 (2006); see also Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at
377-78.
124. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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increase the offender's maximum prison sentence.125  Appellants have
claimed that "the absence of mental retardation is 'the functional equivalent
of an element of a greater offense' 126 because it is 'a fact necessary to put
him to death.' '
127
Courts have consistently reasoned that while the determination of
mental retardation includes fact-finding, presence of mental retardation "is
not the functional equivalent of an element of the crime"' 128 and, thus,
determination by a jury is not constitutionally required. 2 9 Mental
retardation "has nothing to do with the acts that make up the crime itself or
the defendant's mental state while committing the crime, facts the state
traditionally must prove."'
130
Furthermore, the lack of mental retardation is not the equivalent of a
fact that increases the defendant's possible penalty.1 3 1 On the contrary, a
"[s]entencing factor"... appropriately describes a circumstance,
which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that
supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's
finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. On the
other hand, when the term "sentence enhancement" is used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory
sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. 132
Instead, while a finding of mental retardation may exempt an otherwise
death-eligible defendant, a finding of a lack of MR "does not render an
otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for the death penalty."' 133 A finding
of MR may lessen a possible penalty, while a finding of a lack of MR does
not otherwise raise the "maximum allowable punishment."
134
The limited cases that procedurally require a jury trial posit that this
decision was not "constitutionally based," but that it was instead an
125. Id. at 476.
126. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 378 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19) (italics omitted).
127. Id. (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
128. Grell, 135 P.3d at 706.
129. Id.; see also Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 377; Flores, 93 P.3d at 1267; Head v. Hill, 587
S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2003); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
130. Grell, 135 P.3d at 706.
131. Id.
132. Bowling, 163 S.W.3d at 378 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
133. Grell, 135 P.3d.at 707.
134. Flores, 93 P.3d at 1267.
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administrative decision. 135  While some states permit either the judge or
jury to make the MR determination, 136 in many states it is the judge and not
the jury who will decide. If the fact-finder determines the defendant does
not have mental retardation, nothing precludes the defendant from raising
mental retardation as mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of
the trial.1
37
C. What is the Burden of Proof and Who Must Bear It?
Perhaps the greatest variance between the states regarding their
implementation of procedures for determination of mental retardation is the
question of the requisite burden of proof on the issue. Appellants have
unsuccessfully used the Apprendi reasoning to argue that because a finding
that the defendant does not have MR leaves the defendant eligible for the
death penalty, the state must prove MR to a jury by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 38 At this time, no state requires the government to bear
the burden of proof.
139
Most states that have addressed the question of burden of proof have
required the defendant to prove mental retardation by a preponderance of
the evidence. 140  Only four states have set the standard at clear and
135. See, e.g. New Jersey v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 192 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the
defendant must prove to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence the presence of MR. This
showing is conducted after the guilt phase and before the sentencing phase of the trial.)
136. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1) (2007) (stating that the "jury shall
try the issue of mental retardation of a capital defendant during the capital sentencing hearing
unless the state and the defendant agree that the issue is to be tried by the judge. If the state and
the defendant agree, the issue of mental retardation of a capital defendant may be tried prior to
trial by the judge alone.").
137. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(4) (LexisNexis 2007) ("A ruling by the
court that the evidence of diminished intelligence introduced by the defendant does not preclude
the death penalty under subsection (2) of this section shall not restrict the defendant's opportunity
to introduce such evidence at the sentencing determination proceeding as provided in section 29-
2521 or to argue that such evidence should be given mitigating significance.").
138. See Grell, 135 P.3d at 701 (defendant raised three issues unsuccessfully: first, that the
State must bear the burden of proving lack of MR to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; second,
that if the defendant must bear the burden, that the clear and convincing evidence standard was
unconstitutionally high; and lastly, that the determination of MR should be bifurcated).
139. For an argument that the government should bear the burden of proof for mental
retardation, see Stephen B. Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The Constitutional Justification
for Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before Imposing the
Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401 (2004).
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(c) (2007) ("The defendant has the burden of proving mental
retardation at the time of committing the offense by a preponderance of the evidence"); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(3) (2007) ("The burden of proof shall be on the defense to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded,"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/114-15(b) (West 2007) ("The issue of the defendant's mental retardation shall be
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convincing evidence.' 4' Georgia set the standard of proof to beyond a
reasonable doubt, a burden otherwise relegated only to the state, in order to
ensure there are few unnecessary deprivations of liberty.
42
D. The Standard of Review for Mental Retardation on Appellate Review
Few states have addressed the standard of appellate review when
evaluating a determination of lack of mental retardation. Alabama reviews
for "plain error,"' 143 while California reviews the "mixed question of law
and fact ... independently."' 144 On appeal in Ohio, the mental retardation
determination is reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard. 145 As time
progresses, more state appellate courts will weigh in as they review trial
court determinations of mental retardation.
V. Going Forward: Enacting Meaningful Legal Definitions and
Creating Appropriate Tests for the
Identification of Mental Retardation
It has been nearly one hundred years since the official marriage of
psychiatry and psychology with law. 146  Criminal law employs many
determined in a pretrial hearing. The court shall be the fact finder on the issue of the defendant's
mental retardation and shall determine the issue by a preponderance of evidence in which the
moving party has the burden of proof,"); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5. I(C)(1) ("Any
defendant in a capital case making a claim of mental retardation shall prove the allegation by a
preponderance of the evidence."); see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2007); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(4) (LexisNexis 2007);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.098(5)(b) (LexisNexis 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.I(C)
(West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-13-203(c) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15(a)-104(12)(a)
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (2007); see also Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E.2d 90,
103 (Ind. 2005) (holding that the state may not require a showing by such a high standard as clear
and convincing evidence); Russell v. Mississippi, 849 So. 2d 95, 148 (Miss. 2003); Jimenez, 880
A.2d 468; Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011; Blonner, 127 P.3d 1135; Pennsylvania v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d
202 (Pa. 2003); Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 2003); Briseno, 134 S.W.3d 1.
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1102
(West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2007); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(2007). Of interest, Tennessee requires an appellant show by clear and convincing evidence that
they have MR in order to obtain a post-conviction hearing on the matter. Howell, 151 S.W.3d
450.
142. GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2007). Three states have not set a standard of proof:
Connecticut, Kansas, and Kentucky.
143. Exparte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 2002).
144. People v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
145. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011.
146. Edwin I. Megargee, Reflections on Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, in
ABNORMAL OFFENDERS, DELINQUENCY, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9, 9 (John Gunn
& David P. Farrington, eds., John Wiley & Sons 1982) [hereinafter ABNORMAL OFFENDERS]. In
categorizations: insanity, mental illness, competency, mental retardation,
and more that facially mirror similar terms in the mental health sciences.
Each plays a different role in the criminal process, serving as different
defenses, excuses, or mitigating evidence. However, there is an "imperfect
fit" between clinical and legal understandings of these classifications,
including definitions of mental retardation.
147
As an American Psychological Association Task Force on the criminal
justice system reported:
Legal education generally is not part of the education of a
psychologist, and confusion on the part of mental health
professionals in court concerning basic concepts of criminal law
appears to be common. Given that the decisions made in the
criminal justice system on the basis of psychological reports and
testimony are so often fateful for the individuals involved, ignorance
of relevant legal concepts and the ornanizational context in which
they operate is particularly distressing.
The DSM-IV manual importantly carries the warning that in determining
legal standards for responsibility or disability, additional information
outside of scientific categorizations of mental retardation, schizophrenia,
etc., will be required.149 There is a difference between statutory definitions
and the scientific requirements for a finding of MR.
The fact that the courts and legislatures have largely chosen to adopt
an arbitrary IQ score as a requirement for proving mental retardation is an
1909, the first "juvenile court clinic" was established in which a psychiatrist and psychologist
participated in legal proceedings in the Chicago Juvenile Detention Home. Id
147. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 55, 58-59 (John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 1995) (citing the DSM-IV (citation omitted)).
148. Megargee, supra note 146, at 13-14 (citing the APA, 1978 (citation omitted)).
149. SLOVENKO, supra note 147, at 58-59 (citing the DSM-IV (citation omitted)). The
current DSM-IV-TR states that:
When the DSM-IV categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for
forensic purposes, there are significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused
or misunderstood. These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the
questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not
sufficient to establish the existence for legal purposes of a "mental disorder," "mental
disability," "mental disease," or "mental defect."... It is precisely because
impairments, abilities, and disabilities vary widely within each diagnostic category that
assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or
disability.... [Moreover,] a diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications
regarding the causes of the individual's mental disorder or its associated
impairments ... [such as] the individual's degree of control over the behaviors that may
be associated with the disorder.
DSM-IV-TR at xxxii-xxxiii (4th ed., text revised).
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example of this dissonance.150  For example, the Court reasoned that
exemption from the death penalty was due in part to an individual with
mental retardation's inability for logical reasoning. Yet these concepts are
expressly not tested in standard IQ tests.'15  This deprives defendants of
their constitutional right to an individualized sentence... and ensures that
individuals whose "lesser culpability. .. does not merit [the death
penalty]"'' 53 will nonetheless find themselves on death row.
The question of mental retardation becomes a "mixed question of law
and fact."' 154 Unlike the insanity defense wherein a defendant is absolved
of criminal responsibility because of a lack of knowledge between what is
right and wrong, the Supreme Court noted that those with mental
retardation are criminally responsible for their actions. 55 Their culpability
is lessened, thereby justifying a categorical exemption from the death
penalty. 156 In its decision in Atkins, the Court cited to definitions of mental
retardation promulgated by the AAMR and APA. 157  Yet while
undoubtedly the amici briefs by these various organizations shaped the
Court's understanding and analysis in Atkins, the Court was unwilling to
ascribe to a definition, or identify those characteristics inherent in mental
retardation that require their exemption from the death penalty.
Science and the law must work collaboratively "in selecting research
questions and in formulating [research] designs that guarantee relevance to
the law as well as to psychology."'158  A first step in this process is
recognizing what psychology has to offer to law, and what psychology is
currently unable to provide for legal questions. The imperfect alignment
between legal and scientific operational definitions does not necessitate an
absence from science in the courtroom. Instead, a problem arises with a
legal system that does not account for scientific knowledge.
150. See supra Part III.A. 1 and accompanying notes.
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, see also supra Part I.A. 1 and accompanying notes.
152. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (finding a distinction and requirement to treat capital
defendants with "that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual."). Further, "[t]he
nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital
sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in
imposing the death sentence." Id.
153. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
154. SLOVENKO, supra note 147, at 61.
155. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 308 n.3.
158. June Louin Tapp, Reflections on a Decade of Law and Psychology in the United States,
in ABNORMAL OFFENDERS, supra note 141, at 83.
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VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia must be revisited
in order to articulate minimum constitutional requirements that must be
implemented by the States to facilitate the recognition and identification of
defendants with mental retardation. While traditionally the Court has left
matters of criminal law and procedure to the States, the Court must
operationally define the scientific terms it employs in this area where
science and the law necessarily meet. This way, the states will be able to
comply with their constitutional mandate to exempt individuals with mental
retardation from the death penalty.
In reaching its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court looked to
science, their own sentiments regarding whether individuals with mental
retardation should be exempted from the death penalty, and consensus as
indicated by the state legislatures. None of these bases alone can justify the
exemption. Yet, it is also unclear how these bases work together. It is no
wonder then that the states are employing varying procedures and using
different standards to identify mental retardation.
Ceiling IQ scores must not be decisive in establishing mental
retardation when the death penalty is at stake. To determine whether
individuals have sufficient impairments to exempt them from the death
penalty, courts should intead use adaptive behavioral instruments in order
to more accurately assess each individual defendant. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court must ensure that states do not impose too heavy a burden
on defendants trying to prove they suffer from mental retardation. In
Akins, the Court took a first step toward protecting individuals with mental
retardation. Its work, however, is not yet done.
[Vol. 35:2
